This paper quanties the direct impact of taxes on income distribution at the household level in Chile and estimates the distributional eect of several changes in the tax structure. We nd that income distributions before and after taxes are very similar (Gini coecients of 0.4889 and 0.4920, respectively). Moreover, radical modications of the structure, such as raising the value added tax from 18 to 25% or substituting a 20% at tax for the present progressive income tax (top marginal rate of 48% for monthly incomes over $6,000) aect the after-tax distribution only slightly.
Introduction
Income distribution remains one of the most debated economic issues in developing countries, and Chile is no exception. 2 Although poverty has declined fast and steadily during the last ten years, inequality has not changed much. Quite often it is concluded that the stagnation of the income distribution is due to inappropriate policies that should be replaced by direct redistributive measures. Given that one of the ways the state can aect income distribution is through the tax system, there is permanent discussion on the distributional eects of taxes. This discussion heats up whenever the government proposes some tax amendment. For example, whenever it has announced its intention to raise the rate of the Value Added Tax (VAT), a heated debate has ensued over its incidence and distributional impact. On the other hand, many people react with concern when the possibility of reducing the progressivity of income taxes is raised, because they think this will signicantly increase income inequality.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the distributional impact of the Chilean tax system and to assess the sensitivity of the distribution of income to changes in the structure of taxes and rates. We d o s o b y constructing a model that incorporates the main taxes and allowances in place in Chile in 1994. We estimate the true income of individuals 3 with data from the 1994 National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN) taken by the Planning Ministry, and \match" this information with taxpayer records kept by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (SII). In this way w e are able to estimate the extent of underreporting of income, as well as deductions for allowances which w e impute for each income percentile. At the same time, using data from the Family Budget Survey (EPF) from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), carried out in 1987-88, we estimate the composition of household consumption and the amount of indirect taxes that each household pays.
Like most studies for developed countries, we conclude that the tax system has little eect on income distribution (before-and after-tax Gini coecients of 0.4889 and 0.4920). We also show that major departures from current tax rates do not alter this conclusion. For example raising the VAT rate from 18% to 25%, or replacing the present income tax (top marginal rate of 48% for monthly incomes over US$6,000) by a at tax with a uniform marginal rate of 20%, hardly alters the income distribution at all. The data suggests that 2 For recent studies on income distribution in Chile see Beyer (1996) , Contreras (1996) and Cowan and De Gregorio (1996) . 3 of incidence assumptions. 7 Unlike these studies, we incorporate the multisectoral eects of indirect taxes in greater detail. Using the 1986 National Accounts input-output matrix we estimate the eect of taxes charged on inputs on the tax burden faced by households that consume the nal goods incorporating those inputs. Moreover, our data enable us to estimate the number of non-lers and the magnitude of underreporting of the income tax.
Our work updates that of Aninat, Arellano and Foxley (1980) , who used a similar methodology to study the distribution of the tax burden under the tax system in force in Chile in 1969, and the study by S c hkolnik (1993) , who estimated the distribution of the tax burden and government spending at the quintile level in 1990. Access to a series of data sources at the micro level which h a v e not been previously exploited, in particular individual taxpayer records kept at the SII, enable us to work at the level of each income percentile, thereby obtaining more precise estimates of the way the direct tax burden is distributed. Second, the program we construct enables us to estimate the distributive consequences of tax amendments such a s c hanges in rates or alterations to allowances. Third, we present the rst estimation of the magnitude of underreporting of incomes in Chile and its distributive impact using detailed and comprehensive microdata.
Before proceeding, we mention the main limitations of our model. In the rst place, the calculations assume that changes in the tax system do not aect the composition of spending or production decisions. Therefore, our model does not allow us to assess the welfare eect of the distortions that taxes create, nor how the costs of such distortions are distributed. Incorporating these eects would require a computable general equilibrium model, which g o e s b e y ond the scope of this paper. 8 Having said this, the approach w e adopt has the virtue of allowing us to work with microeconomic information which is considerably more detailed than what can be incorporated in computable general equilibrium models. 9 In the second place our income denition is annual. As is well known, annual income is not always a good reection of permanent income, and this may lead to an exaggeration of both inequality and the regressivity of consumption taxes (see the discussion in Section 3.1).
Third, income gures reported by the CASEN survey for the higher centiles is likely to 7 A second type of study estimates the income each individual perceives over her lifetime and the total amount of taxes she will pay. The most important study in this line of research is that of Fullerton and Rogers (1993) for the United States, which uses a panel of individuals and determines the incidence of each tax with the help of a computable general equilibrium model. 8 Studies which use a computable general equilibrium model for the United States are Ballard et al. (1985) (a one year horizon) and Fullerton and Rogers (1993) (intertemporal horizon). 9 To solve a computable general equilibrium model one needs to iterate repeatedly until an equilibrium set of prices is found; this can only be done by limiting the size of the sample or by aggregating microdata. be less reliable, for which reason this paper may underestimate the distributive impact of the tax system on these centiles.
Fourth, in some cases the CASEN survey does not allow us to distinguish incomes that should form part of the taxable base from those that are exempt. Thus, part of what we identify as underreporting of income does not correspond to evasion but to income that taxpayers legally do not have to declare. For the same reason it will not be possible to estimate separately the eects of eliminating certain tax-free allowances.
Fifth, we assume that the evasion of indirect taxes (e.g., VAT) only benets producers. The reason is that the available data does not enable us to estimate the distributional eects of the evasion of indirect taxes, because the CASEN survey does not allow u s t o identify the owners of rms evading taxes. Finally, and for this same reason, we assume that prots retained by rms are not income for the households that own those rms during the year in which the income accrues. This has two implications: (a) income is probably more concentrated than is suggested either by the CASEN survey or the results we present, and (b) undistributed prots from investment companies, set up to avoid the highest marginal rates of the Global Complementary tax, are not included as household income in our calculations. 10 This, together with the fact that income taxes in Chile are integrated, means that the First Category Tax, which i s c harged on company prots, has no eect on income distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the main features of the Chilean tax system. In section 3 we describe the methodology and the data sources we use. Section 4 estimates the progressivity of the tax system in place in 1994 and shows that the distribution of income is remarkably insensitive to radical modications of the tax structure. In section 5 we present the arithmetic exercises. Section 6 presents the model. Section 7 summarizes the conclusions.
2 The Chilean tax system: a primer
In this section we briey describe the main features of the Chilean tax system. Direct taxes. The main direct tax in Chile is the income tax or Impuesto a la Renta. In 1994 it comprised three taxes: (a) A 15% at business tax (Primera Categor a); (b) a progressive w age tax (Segunda Categor a) and a progressive general income tax (Global 10 In Section 4 we briey discuss how our results would be aected by including income from investment companies in our denition of income. Complementario, henceforth GC). 11 On an annual basis, marginal rates and income brackets of the wage and general income tax are the same. However, while the wage tax is paid on a monthly basis, the GC tax is levied on annual income. Both the wage and GC taxes are personal, that is they are levied on individuals and not households. The main feature of the income tax is that it is integrated. Each y ear individuals consolidate all their incomes, regardless of their source, into a comprehensive taxbase, and then compute their total tax obligation by applying the progressive scale of the GC tax. All business and wage taxes paid on incomes included in the comprehensive taxbase are 11 See Table 3 for income tax brackets. then deducted as credits from the GC tax dues. Two features of the income tax imply that it is not fully integrated, however. First, prots retained by rms do not enter the GC comprehensive base; correspondingly, credits on the business tax cannot be claimed until prots are paid out. Second, the progressive w age tax is levied on a monthly basis. Those individuals whose only source of income are wages do not le a GC tax return. If their wage income uctuates from month to month they may end up paying higher taxes than an individual with exactly the same annual income but who receives income from sources dierent than wages.
There are four major allowances in the income tax. First, Article 57 bis., letters (a) and (b) of the income tax law, which allows GC taxpayers to deduct from their tax base 20% of the amount purchased in newly-issued shares in publicly owned corporations in perpetuity, as well as nancial savings in specially designated instruments. Second, an exemption on savings of less than about US$1,000 per year, which benets taxpayers who pay only the wage tax. Third, an exemption on income arising from properties favored by the Law Decree 2 of 1968 (DFL2). Lastly, unincorporated businesses in several activities (among them agriculture and transport) and small businesses are favored by simplied accounting rules that make most of their income exempt.
In addition, Chilean tax law allows individuals to set up a company, transform part of their personal incomes into business income, compute various expenses as costs, and pay the at 15% business tax on prots. As long as earnings are not distributed they avoid the highest rates of the GC tax. This enables individuals both to smooth their tax burden and postpone paying the GC tax. Moreover, several schemes allow them to partially avoid the top brackets of the GC tax altogether. For example, relatives in lower brackets may o wn part of the company, the company m a y buy assets that are used in personal consumption, or the business can be sold after accumulating prots and be favored by exemptions granted to non-habitual capital gains. Table 1 shows the yield of each direct tax both as a percentage of total tax revenues and as percentage of GDP. It can be seen that in 1996 direct taxes accounted for 29.5% of total tax revenues (5.4% of GDP). There are two direct taxes that we ignore in this study because we lack the necessary data to allocate them to households: A yearly property tax and an inheritance tax which represent 4.2% of total tax revenues. Moreover, for obvious reasons we do not consider the additional tax paid by foreign corporations when prots are paid out at their headquarters, and the business tax paid by state-owned companies.
Indirect taxes. The main indirect taxes in Chile are a comprehensive v alue-added tax (VAT) which in 1994 was levied on most transactions at the uniform rate of 18%, a general uniform import tari of 11%, 12 and a series of excise taxes levied on particular goods like alcohol, tobacco, gasoline and luxury goods (e.g., jewelry, most cars, lotteries and furs). Some goods and services are exempted from VAT, notably professional, educational and health services, transportation, and cultural and sports events. As can be seen from Table 1 , indirect taxes account for more than 70% of tax revenues (13% of GDP). In the exercises below w e ignore the indirect tax that is levied on bank cheques and credit operations, because we lack the data needed to impute them to households (3.7% of total tax revenues).
3 Concepts, data sources and methodology
Denition of income
This paper focuses on income distribution at the household level. By \income of a household" we mean the sum of the incomes of each of the members of the household received from work, retirement and survivor pensions, allowances for the disabled, interest paid by rms and nancial institutions, prots distributed by rms, consumption of own production, private transfers (e.g., alimony p a yments and allowances) and imputed income from housing. This denition does not consider any accrued income or government transfers. It therefore excludes: (a) Prots that rms did not distribute during 1994. (b) Government transfers in money or kind. (c) Proceeds from the sale of nancial or physical assets. Company prots are excluded because our source of data on income, the CASEN survey, d o e s not identify to whom prots retained by rms belong. 13 For the same reason, we are not able to impute the income received through companies formed to avoid the higher brackets of the GC tax. Government transfers (e.g., family allowances, welfare payments) are not included because our aim is to estimate the distributive impact of the tax system prior to any g o v ernment redistribution.
We measure income on an annual basis. As is well known, there are several reasons why current income may not be an appropriate measure of the lifetime income of an individual: the individual may be unemployed during the year the survey was taken; some individuals are subject to considerable yearly income uctuations; incomes vary over the life cycle, 12 Because of several free trade agreements, imports from some countries pay l o w er taris. Moreover, selected imports also pay a n tidumping counterveiling duties. 13 Ockner and Pechman (1974) distribute prots retained by rms in proportion to each individuals dividend income. The 1994 CASEN survey groups income from capital in a single category, without distinguishing between dividends and interest income. Thus, it is not possible to impute retained prots at the individual level.
and towards the end of their lives people tend to consume part of their savings. Thus, for example, a person whose current income is low m a y h a v e a high permanent income and be intertemporally wealthy. Unfortunately, there is no data in Chile to carry out a study of intertemporal incidence. As regards our aim in this paper, it should be noted that studies which h a v e estimated income distribution over the life cycle in developed countries usually nd that inequality is considerably less than that suggested by annual studies. 14 Second, when the denition of intertemporal income is used, saving is not necessarily exempt from consumption taxes. This point is important, for in the next section we nd that in Chile VAT is regressive, largely because income saved during a given year does not pay this tax, and the wealthiest deciles save a larger fraction of their incomes. It follows that the regressivity o f V A T w ould be less if one considered an intertemporal framework.
Data requirements
As we already mentioned, in Chile the income tax is personal, it is levied at the indivual, not at the household level. Therefore, to estimate the distributive impact of the tax system at the household level we need the following information: Ideally we w ould obtain all the data from the same source: taking a sample of households for which one knows each of its income sources, its consumption patterns, the tax-free allowances it was granted and what it paid in terms of each tax. However, in Chile no sample of households with these characteristics is available, so instead we use several sources and 14 See Chapter 1 of Fullerton and Rogers (1993) for a review of studies of intertemporal incidence. make assumptions to splice them together. 15 Below w e briey describe our data sources, the assumptions on incidence we make and the methodology we use to calculate taxes. A detailed description is relegated to a rather lengthy Methodological Appendix, available upon request from the authors.
The data
Incomes. The incomes of each individual and household were estimated with data from the 1994 CASEN survey. This is a biannual survey taken by the Planning Ministry. I n 1994 it comprised 178,057 individuals from 45,379 households. The survey separates the income of each individual into its dierent sources and allows us to identify the household to which the individual belongs. Our calculations assume that each individual reports her true income. Survey data were adjusted by ECLAC 16 so that once the appropriate weights are applied total per capita sample income coincides with the national accounts gures for each income category. 17 Table 2 shows the top, bottom and average monthly per-capita income of households in each income decile, before taxes (all the gures we present are in US dollars of November of 1994).
Direct taxes. The SII database contains data on 312,124 taxpayers of GC and 159,626 taxpayers who pay only the wage tax. These correspond to 1995 income tax returns (scal year 1994) and account for virtually all revenues from the GC tax, and half of wage tax revenues. 18 Accordingly, in the case of the wage tax the sample of 159,626 taxpayers who only pay that tax was assumed to be representative of the sample universe. Table 3 shows the number of taxpayers by income bracket as declared to the SII.
Allowances. The amount of tax-free allowances corresponding to Article 57 bis., letters (a) and (b), deducted by each individual was estimated using data from the SII database described in the previous paragraph. In 1994, 37,101 taxpayers took advantage of letter (a) of Article 57 bis., deducting slightly more than US$135 million from their taxable base. A 15 In their classic study Pechman and Ockner (1974) also splice dierent data sources. However, the information available allowed them to make more precise splices than those permitted by the data available in Chile. 16 The United Nation's Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 17 The proportional dierence between the CASEN and national account data is imputed uniformly for each income category. The one exception is capital income, which is fully imputed to the top quintile of households. The Input-Output Matrix (IOM) calculated by the Central Bank of Chile for 1986 was used to determine the foreign content of domestically-produced goods, both traded and non-traded. Consumption levels were calculated using the EPF data, assuming that the consumption pattern remained unchanged between 1988 and 1994, growing at the same rate as incomes.
Impact of indirect taxes charged on inputs. Import taris and the specic tax on gasoline aect the prices of inputs used in the production of nal goods consumed by households. 19 The IOM was used to estimate the impact of indirect taxes on the prices of nal goods. For each t ype of good included in the IOM, coecients were estimated enabling us to determine what fraction of a households spending on a given type of good corresponds to the indirect payment of a tari or gasoline tax.
Incidence assumptions
We assume that direct taxes (business, wage and GC) are paid wholly by the taxed factors, whereas indirect taxes (VAT, taris, and excise taxes) are paid entirely by consumers. We also assume that the savings rate is exogenous, and that the fraction of a household's income spent on each good is independent of the tax structure; 20 these are standard assumptions in the literature (see for example Ockner and Pechman [1974, ch.3] ). 21 Finally, in the case of Chile it is reasonable to assume that the business tax is not passed on to consumers, because almost all types of businesses are subject to it. There are two scenarios (at least) under which these assumptions are appropriate and consistent. First, a small open economy where all goods are tradable, and purchasing power parity (PPP) holds. Under such conditions, direct taxes cannot be passed on to consumers because the latter would switch t o w ards imported goods. On the other hand, 19 The excise tax on gasoline is levied only when gasoline is used as an input of transport services. 20 The latter assumes that the utility function of the household is Cobb-Douglas. 21 Shah and Whalley (1991) strongly criticize these assumptions for developing-country studies. They point out that import quotas, price controls and black markets, the fact that income taxes tend to be paid only in cities and corruption associated with tax evasion radically change incidence patterns. However none of these apply to Chile: quotas and price controls are virtually nonexistent; income taxes are also monitored in the rural sector, which is, in any case, small; and corruption in tax administration is, by i n ternational standards, low.
if both national and foreign goods are subject to indirect taxes, these will be passed on to consumers. The second scenario is of a closed constant-returns-to-scale economy with Leontief production functions, together with perfectly inelastic factor supplies. In this case any direct tax falls on factors (because their supply is perfectly inelastic) and all indirect taxes are transferred to consumers, because supply prices are determined solely by technology. Note that the national accounts, which w e use to estimate the impact of indirect taxes, are constructed on the basis of these assumptions.
Finally, w e assume that only prots distributed by rms aect the distribution of income, and that the business tax is paid wholly by those who receive those prots. As has been mentioned already, company prots that are not distributed do not enter our calculation of the income distribution.
Determination of tax burdens
The distribution of household incomes can be constructed on the basis of income data obtained from the adjusted CASEN survey. 22 The distributional impact of the tax system, and its progressivity, are found by substracting what each household pays in direct and indirect taxes from its incomes. The methodology for calculating the amount of taxes each household pays is described below. 23 
Amount paid in direct taxes
As was mentioned above, income taxes in Chile are personal. Therefore, to estimate the direct tax burden each household bears, we rst estimate the direct taxes paid by each individual and then add up these amounts to estimate what is paid by each household. The direct taxes paid by each individual are estimated by deducting from the tax base any income she decides not to declare, as well as any allowances. Thus, to estimate the amount paid in direct taxes by each individual in the CASEN survey, a prior estimate is needed of underdeclared income and tax-free allowances beneting the individual. This is done following the following steps: 22 Some income from the CASEN survey is collected on an after-tax basis. For details on how w e obtained pre-tax estimates of these incomes see the Methodological Appendix. 23 In the following discussion we leave out certain details. A detailed description of the calculation methodology is given in the Methodological Appendix.
1. Individuals in the CASEN database whose incomes are high enough to be subject to income tax are separated out. 24 The procedure is then repeated, this time with taxpayers in the SII database. In both cases they are grouped together by centile.
(It is worth remembering that it is not possible to identify individuals covered by the CASEN survey in the SII data base, as the tax ID numbers of those surveyed are not recorded). Table 4 shows the number of taxpayers declaring income to the SII by income bracket, and the number that should have declared according to the CASEN survey. 2. The number of non-lers is dened as the dierence between the number of individuals in the CASEN survey with incomes high enough to be subject to tax, and those individuals who actually led a declaration with the SII. According to this procedure 239,148 individuals did not le in 1994. To estimate the income of nonlers, a random sample of individuals of size equal to this number was drawn among CASEN individuals. We assumed that individuals chosen by this procedure were the non-lers. 25 Table 5 ranks CASEN individuals according to their taxable (monthly) income bracket. The rst two columns show the estimated number of non-lers by income bracket; column 3 shows the amounts underreported.
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In addition, individuals subject to tax are divided into GC taxpayers and wage taxpayers, so as to impute the allowances provided by Article 57 bis only to the former. 25 We assumed that those with annual incomes higher than $15,000 (5% of all taxpayers) always report at least some of their income to the SII. For the rest, the probability of not reporting decreases linearly with income. The distribution was parameterized so that (a) the probability of not ling is zero for incomes equal to $15,000; (b) the expected number of non-lers is equal to the actual number of non-lers. 4. Tax-free allowances under Article 57 bis., letters (a) and (b) corresponding to each individual in the CASEN survey were estimated in the same way as underreporting, i.e., for each percentile of the CASEN survey the amount of tax-free allowances under Article 57 bis was imputed for the equivalent SII percentile. This amount w as distributed among individuals comprising each percentile in proportion to income.
5. Last, the taxable income declared by each individual in the CASEN survey was obtained by subtracting underreporting from their true income. The amount of tax paid by each taxpayer was then obtained by applying the corresponding GC structure of 26 As mentioned before, this underreporting does not necessarily amount t o e v asion, because some taxpayers declare less income than their true total income. The CASEN survey does not enable us to identify incomes that do not pay tax for this reason.
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The wealthiest decile accounts for 64.7 percent of the total amount underreported rates and Article 57 bis. allowances.
Once we know the incomes before and after income tax for each individual, it is possible to construct the income distribution at the household level. Since each individual in the CASEN survey belongs to a household, the income of every household, both before and after paying direct taxes, can be found by adding together the incomes of its members. The impact of changes in the tax structure is found by repeating this exercise with new tax parameters.
Amount paid in indirect taxes
The burden of indirect taxes borne by each household is estimated as follows:
1. A tax on transactions can aect the price of nal goods both directly (if the nal good itself is taxed) and indirectly (if the inputs into the nal good are taxed). So, to estimate the eect of indirect taxes on the prices of nal goods the IOM input-output coecients were used. Using this information together with the tax rates applied to dierent goods, the fraction of the nal price corresponding to each of the indirect taxes was calculated for each t ype of good in the IOM classication. 28 2. The composition of household expenditure on about 2,000 goods and services was obtained from the family expenditure survey (EPF) at the decile level. These goods were grouped in the 75 categories dened in the IOM. Households covered by the family expenditure survey were ordered by income decile, and for each decile the expenditure of a representative household was calculated. This spending pattern was then assumed to be representative of the expenditure of all households in that decile.
3. The fraction of its income that each household pays in indirect taxes for each good is obtained by adding together, over all IOM goods, the product of (a) the fraction of the nal price of each IOM good corresponding to each of the taxes (point 1), and (b) the expenditure of the representative household on each IOM good, expressed as a fraction of its income (point 2). Thus, for the representative household in each decile,we obtain its payments of each indirect tax as a fraction of its income.
Using the results obtained in the previous points, for each household in the CASEN survey the percentage of total expenditure used in paying each indirect tax was estimated.
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The details of this procedure and those described in the following points can be found in the Methodological Appendix.
CASEN survey households are grouped in deciles (in the same order as EPF households), and the amount paid in terms of each indirect tax was obtained by adding over the dierent goods. The impact of changes in the structure of indirect taxes is obtained by repeating this exercise with new parameters.
Results
In this section we present the results of a series of exercises we carried out with the model described in the previous section. In Section 4.1 we examine the distributive consequences of the 1994 tax structure. As most other studies, we conclude that the tax structure had virtually no eect on the distribution of income. If anything, the tax structure in force in 1994 was slightly regressive. Section 4.2 suggests that this result is not due to avoidance or evasion: we show that even if all incomes had paid the tax due on them, the distribution would have not changed much. Finally, in Section 4.3 we show the distributional impact of four big changes to the tax structure: the abolition of import taris, a rise in VAT from the actual rate of 18% to 25%, a doubling of the rate of the gasoline tax and the replacement of the current progressive income tax with a at tax. In each case we conclude that the distributional impact is surprisingly small. Table 6 shows the distribution of income by deciles in 1994 before any tax is paid. The Gini coecient is 0.4899, and the ratio between the incomes of the wealthiest and the poorest quintile (henceforth \ratio") is equal to 13.57. It is clear that income is very unequally distributed: the wealthiest quintile receives 56.5% of total income against 4.2% of the poorest quintile.
The distribution of the tax burden in 1994
Column 2 in Table 7 shows the after-tax income distribution (column 3 reproduces Table  6 ). This is slightly more unequal than the pre-tax distribution. The Gini coecient rises from 0.4899 to 0.4920, and the ratio goes up from 13.57 to 14.13 . Column 3, which shows the fraction of income that each decile pays in taxes, suggests that the 1994 tax system marginally worsened the distribution, as it was slightly regressive. Indeed, on average the ve poorest deciles paid 17.2% of their incomes in taxes, as against 15.2% of the ve wealthiest deciles. The second decile is the group that pays the largest fraction of its income in taxes (18.5%) whereas the ninth decile pays the lowest rate (14.1%). 29 29 Note that while the average tax rate paid by the top decile is smaller than the overall average, the To understand why the Chilean tax system is slightly regressive, it is useful to look at the last three columns of Table 7 which show the progressivity of the income tax, the valueadded tax (VAT), excise taxes (gasoline, jewelry, tobacco, etc.) and import taris. On the one hand, the regressivity of the VAT is evident: the highest-income deciles pay a smaller fraction of their incomes in VAT. The only exception is the poorest decile which spends a smaller fraction on VAT than deciles 2, 3 and 4, because a signicant part of this group's consumption is not subject to VAT as it constitutes consumption of own production. 30;31 The income tax, on the other hand, is clearly progressive, yet the revenue it raises is very small. 32 Only the wealthiest decile pays more than 1% of its income in income tax, and even in this case its average rate is only 3.61%, compared with 7% paid in VAT and after-tax share of the richest decile is lower than the pre-tax share. This occurs because after calculating taxes our program reorders households according to their after-tax per capita income. For example, some of the households of the richest decile fall to the ninth decile. This accounts for the fall in the share of the richest decile.
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It should be noted that if the only tax was VAT c harged at a rate of t percent, a family that consumes all its income in goods subject to tax would pay a fraction equal to t=(1+t) percent in tax. Thus, with VAT at 18 percent, the family would pay 15.25 percent of its income in tax. Nevertheless, since we assume that evasion only benets producers, the 7 percent rate which appears in Table 7 suggests that only 46 percent of the income of the wealthiest decile pays VAT. This is because the wealthiest decile has a higher savings rate, and several items of consumption, personal services in particular, are not subject to VAT. In fact, the fraction of expenditure not subject to VAT is about 20% for all deciles. 31 As has been mentioned in the previous section, considering annual incomes probably exaggerates the regressivity of the VAT. 32 Fontaine and Vergara (1997) emphasize this point. 
Scenario with neither underreporting nor allowances
The meager revenue performance of the income tax is surprising, although it does coincide with the impression widely held in Chile that \everybody avoids the income tax." An interesting exercise is to calculate whether the income distribution would become more equal if both tax-free allowances and underreporting were completely eliminated. In so far as the assumptions of our model are valid, this exercise sets an upper bound on what the 1994 tax system could have a c hieved in terms of income distribution. Table 8 shows the income distribution and progressivity of the income tax when (a) only tax-free allowances are eliminated, and (b) both tax-free allowances and underreporting of income are eliminated. Column 1 shows again the income distribution resulting from the 1994 tax structure, and column 4 shows the progressivity of the corresponding income tax.
The second column of Table 8 shows that the eect of allowances (mainly Article 57 bis,
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It is important to remember that our denition of income does not include undistributed prots of investment companies set up to avoid the highest marginal rates of GC tax. If these were included, income would be even more concentrated: since one reason for setting up such a company i s t o a v oid marginal tax rates above 15% (the business tax rate); incomes at this level are only found in the wealthiest decile. Nevertheless, since prots retained in a company p a y a n a v erage rate of 15%, the progressivity of the income tax would probably increase. and DFL2) on the distribution of income is irrelevant: the income share of the wealthiest decile goes down slightly from 40.63% to 40.38%; the progressivity of income tax (column 4) rises marginally. A somewhat greater impact would be achieved by eliminating underreporting, which is signicant a s w e s a w in the previous section. The third column of Table  8 shows that, in this case, the share of the wealthiest decile falls to 38.91% of total income. The Gini coecient improves from 0.4920 to 0.4796, whereas the ratio falls from 14.13 to 13.36. However, while this is the biggest change in income distribution we shall see in this section, it is still far from impressive, especially when one considers that it assumes that income tax evasion is completely eliminated. It is interesting to mention that in this last scenario the decile that most increases its share in the income distribution is the second wealthiest, rising from 15.73 to 16.15%. Any improvement among the poorest deciles is minimal: for example, the poorest decile raises its income share from 1.28% to 1.32%. the share of the wealthiest decile share is the only one that falls, but not by m uch, from 40.63% to 38.91%. The last column of Table 8 shows that if both underreporting and tax-free allowances are eliminated, the average tax rate of the wealthiest decile rises from 3.61% to 5.91%. This average rate is low i f w e consider that in 1994 the top marginal rate was 48% for individuals with monthly incomes over US$6,000. Table 9 , which shows the distribution of income within the wealthiest decile, reveals why the revenue potential of the income tax is so small. One needs to get to the 99-th centile to nd households whose monthly percapita income is above US$1,250. In other words, a signicant fraction of households in the \wealthiest" decile are not so wealthy after all, so the revenue performance of a progressive tax is low. 34 
Radical modications of the 1994 tax structure
The results reported above suggest that the 1994 tax structure did not greatly aect the distribution of income. To see whether this conclusion holds for a variety of possible modications to the tax structure, in this section we explore the distributional impact of four radical changes: (a) increasing the VAT rate from 18% to 25%; (b) abolishing import taris; (c) doubling the excise tax rate on gasoline; and (d) substituting a at tax for the current income tax.
34
It is important to remember, however, that the distribution gures are calculated without including prots retained by rms. Therefore, the gures we h a v e at our disposal do not allow us to identify income retained by i n v estment companies formed to postpone/avoid/evade the Global Complementary tax. Furthermore, it is important to note that the CASEN survey is not intended to characterize the wealthiest centile, so the probability that the country's really wealthy households are surveyed is low. Table 10 suggests that the distributive impact of the three rst changes are not large (columns 2, 3 and 4). Particularly surprising is the negligible impact caused by the increase in VAT. The Gini coecient goes up marginally from 0.4920 to 0.4963, and the ratio from 14.13 to 14.47. The wealthiest deciles share of income grows from 40.63% to 40.98%, whereas the shares of the other deciles fall slightly. The distributive impacts of eliminating taris or doubling gasoline tax are even smaller (columns 3 and 4), although distribution does improve slightly. The Flat Tax has been under discussion for some time in the United States, its main academic advocates being Hall and Rabushka (1996) . The main virtue of this tax is that it supposedly favors saving, apart from allowing considerable simplication in tax administration. However, it is criticized for being regressive. Here we examine the eects of a at tax that leaves the rst US$2,500 of monthly income exempt. 35 The at tax is interesting because it represents a radical change to the tax in force in 1994 and apparently ought t o 35 A at tax proposal typically includes an exempt bracket, so as to give it a certain degree of progressivity.
signicantly worsen income distribution. 36 Table 11 shows the distributional impact of a reform of this type. The rst and fourth columns once again show income distribution in 1994. Columns 2 and 3 show the distributive impact of the at tax, in the rst case assuming no change in allowances and underreporting, and in the second case assuming that both are completely eliminated. As a at tax ought to reduce underreporting because it facilitates supervision and makes avoidance less worthwhile, it is to be expected that the actual eect of a reform of this type would fall between the two scenarios considered. Table 11 suggests that the regressive impact of a at tax of the type considered is surprisingly small. When the current tax-free allowances are maintained, together with the same level of underreporting, the fraction of income received by the wealthiest decile rises from 40.63% to 41.50%; the Gini coecient rises slightly from 0.4920 to 0.4985, and the ratio from 14.13 to 14.52. If tax-free allowances and underreporting are eliminated, the income distribution would be almost identical to that obtaining under the 1994 tax 36 Even though the tax-free bracket mentioned above makes the at tax progressive, it is less progressive than the current income tax. The tax-exempt bracket was chosen so that no taxpayer ends up paying a higher rate than with the current tax structure. structure. The wealthiest decile's share rises only marginally, from 40.63% to 40.72%. The nal two columns, which show the progressivity of the tax in each case, suggest that tax revenues would fall.
Some unpleasant redistributive arithmetic
The results in the previous section suggest that changes in the progressivity of the tax system do not aect the distribution of income signicantly, e v en when quite radical modications of the tax structure are considered. In this section we perform some simple arithmetic exercises that suggest why this is so. We show that the amount a tax levies has a larger redistributive impact than its progressivity. F urthermore, the dierence between both determinants of redistribution is larger when the distribution of incomes before taxation is more unequal.
For the discussion that follows we need some notation. Let i denote the share of income of the i-th decile before taxes and redistribution, t i denote the average tax rate paid by the i-th decile, and t P 10 j=1 j t j denote the share of total income paid in taxes. Then the share in income of the i-th decile after taxes but before redistribution (this is the measure reported in the tables presented in the previous section) is given by: 37 0 i 1 t i 1 t i :
Let i denote the share of government transfers that reaches the i-th decile, with P i i = 1 , and assume that a fraction of income is lost in redistribution. Then the share of income of the i-th decile after taxes and redistribution is given by:
From (1) and (2) it follows that the change in the share of income of the i-th decile is:
which is equivalent to:
37
The expressions that follow assume that no individual changes deciles after paying taxes or after social expenditures take place. The tables in the preceding section do incorporate such c hanges.
Expression (3) decomposes the redistribution of income that results from the combined eect of taxation and government expenses, into two components. The decile's change in the share of income is the net result of what it receives in expenditures nanced through taxation ( i t when = 0) and what it contributes towards nancing these expenditures ( i t i when = 0).
Two extreme cases can be analyzed based upon (3) and (4), where for simplicity w e assume = 0. First consider a poor decile ( i ' 0). In this case: 00 i i ' i t; (5) so that, unless targeting is extremely bad, this decile improves its share of income, beneting both from an increase in the overall tax burden and from better targeting. The poorest taxpayers care little about the progressivity of the tax system, since their tax burden is small compared to what the receive i n a n y case.
Next consider the richest decile. It follows from (4) that this decile's share in income will decrease more the better targeted government expenditures are (larger 10 10 ), the larger the overall tax burden (larger t), the more progressive the tax rate (larger t 10 t) and the larger its original share of income (larger 10 ). Next we consider some arithmetic exercises where we calculate the impact on income distribution of taxes and redistribution. The redistribution coecients (the 's) in all the exercises that follow are chosen to mimic the actual distribution of transfers in Chile. 38 Table 12 shows the impact of a progressive income tax that generates the same average rates than the income tax in place in 1994, except that it takes 10% of the richest decile's income. This exercise assumes a progressivity of the income tax that is rather unrealistic and extreme: the average rate paid by the richest decile is almost three times the actual rate (3.61%) and almost twice the rate that would attain with no underreporting and tax brakes (5.91%). The column 1 reproduces the before-tax distribution in Chile in 1994. The column 2 shows the tax burden as a percentage of income. Column 3 shows the distribution of income after taxes are levied but before transfers. The column 4 shows the income distribution after taxes and transfers. For the poorest deciles the impact of taxes on their share of income is quite small (see column 4). The reason, quite simply, is that with t 10 = 10%, P 10 j=1 j t j t = 4 ; 25%, so that In other words, while this progressive income tax decreases the share of the richest decile by almost 2.5 percentage points (from 41.23% to 38.75%), it increases the share of the poorest ve deciles by little more than 4.4% of their pre-tax income share. Thus, for example, the share of the poorest decile increases only by 0.06 points, from 1.35% to 1.41%. Levying this tax decreases the ratio from 13.57 to 12.56 and the Gini coecient from 0.4899 to 0.4720. By contrast, redistribution has a far bigger impact, especially for the three poorest deciles. The share of the poorest decile increases by 0.41 additional percentage points, almost 7 times the impact of the progressive tax. Also, with redistribution the ratio falls to 10.41 and the Gini coecient to 0.4519. Thus, more than half of the improvement in the income distribution, as measured either by the ratio or the Gini coecient, 39 is attributable to redistribution, and not to the progressivity of the tax system.
38
Government expenditures are divided into three categories: pensions (27.7%), transfers (both in money and kind: 37.4%) and general expenses (34.9%). Our measure of autonomous income includes pensions, thus we set = 0 : 277 thereby ignoring administrative costs and deadweight losses associated with taxation. To determine how w ell public transfers are targeted, we follow S c hkolnik (1993) who nds that the poorest quintile receives 37.5% of all transfers, and the next four quintiles receive, respectively, 28.0%, 19.5%, 11.8% and 3.2%. We assume that each decile receives half of the expenditure of the quintile it belongs to. As to the distribution of general expenses, we assume that they are distributed uniformly across deciles. We report in footnotes how our ndings change if we assume that these expenses benet nobody (thus setting = 0 : 626). Finally we h a v e that approximately 75% of government expenditures are nanced with taxes; we assume that the same fraction of the three kinds of expenditures mentioned above are nanced with taxes. 39 In the case of the ratio it is more than two thirds. Table 13 shows the eect of a 10% proportional tax. By denition, the after-tax income distribution does not change. The eect of redistribution, on the other hand, is stronger, because the average tax rate is higher. The ratio falls to 8.83 and the Gini coecient t o 0.4404. Thus, a realistic proportional tax improves the distribution of income more than an unrealistically progressive tax.
Analyzing how the share of income of every decile changes after taxation and redistribution can become rather cumbersome, since in the case of intermediate deciles both the decile's tax burden and what it receives in transfers may be signicant. This motivates deriving a simple expression for the change in an aggregate measure of inequality.
Proposition 5.1 (Change in the Gini coecient) Assume that the absolute tax burden is increasing in before-tax income ( i t i < j t j , for i < j ), 40 that the i 's are d e creasing and denote by G and G t the Gini coecients of the shares of expenditures (the i 's) and the absolute tax burdens (the i t i 's). Denote the Gini coecients of the income distribution before any taxes and redistribution, and after taxes and redistribution, by G and G 00 respectively, and let G G 00 G. Then:
40
This assumption holds even if the tax system is somewhat regressive, given the degrees of inequality prevalent in most countries. In particular, it holds by a wide margin with the Chilean data presented in Table 7 .
In particular, for = 0 :
Proof See the Appendix.
It follows directly from (6) that, for a given overall tax burden (value of t), a more progressive tax system (larger value of G t ) a c hieves a larger improvement in the Gini coecient.
With a proportional tax system we h a v e G t = G. T h us, since most tax systems are not signicantly regressive, the scope for improving the distribution of income via increased progressivity is limited to improving G t from G to 1. In this sense we h a v e that if the initial distribution of income is more unequal, the scope for improving the distribution of income via increased progressivity is smaller. Furthermore, from (7) we see that increasing the progressivity of the tax burden, while the overall tax burden (t) remains xed, oers less scope for improving the distribution of income than increasing the overall tax burden while the distribution of the tax burden remains unchanged. If the initial Gini is in the neighborhood of 0.5, as is the case for many developing countries, the rst strategy can improve the Gini by at most twice as much as the current redistribution of income does, while the second strategy faces no such stringent upper bound. Table 14 shows the distribution of income with the tax structure in place in Chile in 1994, both before taxation and redistribution, and after taxation and redistribution. Even though tax collection is slightly regressive, after government expenses the distribution of income improves considerably: the ratio and Gini fall to 7.42 and 0.4170, respectively. 41 Table 15 decomposes the improvement of the Gini into the contribution of the VAT, the income tax and indirect taxes. 42 Table 15 shows that half the improvement in the income distribution, as measured by the Gini coecient, is due to the regressive v alue added tax. The highly progressive income tax accounts for only one fth of the improvement. This dierence is explained by the fact that the VAT levies more than ve times the amount levied by the income tax. Since how w ell expenditure is targeted is unrelated to the progressivity of the tax system, when progressive and proportional taxes are equally costly to levy and cause the same deadweight loss, it is always better to levy a progressive tax. However, in practice indirect taxes are much easier to levy and administer than direct progressive income taxes. Moreover, the main indirect tax levied in Chile, the VAT, is less distortionary than income taxes. In the next section we present a v ery simple model that enables us to study the determinants of the optimal tax structure when taxes are costly to levy.
6 Inequality and the optimal tax structure In this section we present a simple model of the optimal determination of the tax structure that incorporates the eectiveness in collecting alternative taxes, their progressivity, the distributional preferences of society and the extent to which g o v ernment expenditures are targeted. Somewhat surprisingly, w e nd that proportional taxes are more desirable the more unequal the pre-tax income distribution. 41 If we assume that general government expenses do not benet anybody, the ratio and Gini fall to 8.66 and 0.4418, respectively.
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To obtain this decomposition we compute the change in Gini, after taxation and redistribution, for each tax separately. This decomposition is exact, in the sense that the sum of the changes in Gini is equal to the change when the three taxes are levied simultaneously, when = 0 . The government can levy two taxes. The rst is a proportional income tax, at rate t 1 , that entails collection costs equal to a fraction 1 of the tax collected. The second is a progressive income tax that is levied only on the rich individual, at rate t 2 . This tax entails collection costs equal to a fraction 2 of the tax collected. 44 The degree to which government expenditures are targeted to the poor individual is captured by the parameter 2 [0; 1], the fraction of any g o v ernment expenditure that accrues to this individual. Last, we assume that the tradeo between inequality and the deadweight loss of tax collection is captured by a social welfare function that is increasing in the aggregate after-tax income and decreasing in after-tax income inequality. F or simplicity w e assume this function takes the following form:
The model
where c > 0 captures the degree to which society cares about distributional issues. In the Appendix we show that maximizing this function is (almost) equivalent to maximizing the expected utility of an individual with constant absolute risk aversion coecient c who ex ante is poor with probability 1 2 . The following four constants will simplify our presentation:
The rst two constants are measures of the overall eectiveness of tax collection and expenditure targeting in redistributing income to the poor individual. Larger values of either constant are associated with a more ecient system; the largest possible values are 1 for 43 Note that with two individuals 2 is the Gini coecient of the before-taxes-and-transfers income distribution. 44 The 's can also be interpreted as representing the deadweight loss associated with both taxes. For simplicity w e assume that they depend neither on the tax rate nor on the amount collected. 6.2 The optimal tax system
We study the problem of choosing a tax system (t 1 ; t 2 ) to maximize (8) . We are interested in the dependence of the solution on the parameters of the problem: 1 , 2 , , and c.
Since collection costs are linear, either none or only one of the taxes will be levied at the optimum, but not both. The following proposition characterizes the optimal tax system. Proposition 6.1 (The optimal tax system) Assume that > 1 2 . 45 Given the values of , c and , Figure 1 divides all possible combinations of 1 and 2 into three r e gions. In region 0, characterized b y 1 L 1 and 2 L 2 , it is optimal to levy no tax at all. In region 1, characterized b y 1 L 1 and 2 M 1 , it is optimal to levy only the proportional tax.
The corresponding tax rate is:
Finally, in region 2, characterized b y 2 L 2 and 2 M 1 , it is optimal to levy only the progressive tax. 46 The corresponding optimal rate is:
Proof See Appendix.
The rst statement in the preposition implies that it may be optimal to levy no tax at all when collection costs are high (large values of 1 and 2 ), society does not care much about inequality (low c), or initial inequality i s l o w (small ). 47 Better targeting of expenditures (an increase in ) implies that a given level of redistribution can be attained with lower taxes. If society does not value redistribution very much (low v alue of c) this makes levying taxes less attractive. 48 Yet if society v alues reducing inequality a lot, it 45 This assumption ensures that L1 and L2 in Figure 1 are positive (see below). It may be relaxed at the expense of having to consider three additional gures. 46 That these three regions dene a partition of the unit square follows from the fact that M = L2=L1.
47
A straightforward calculation shows that the partial derivatives of the Li with respect to c and are positive. becomes worthwhile to increase taxes after an increase in .
When redistribution is socially worthwhile, the government c hooses the tax that causes a smaller resource loss. If both taxes are equally costly to levy (that is, 1 = 2 ) i t i s a l w a ys better to levy the progressive tax. 49 The reason is that when taxes are proportional some of the income taken away from the poor individual is wasted ( p t 1 1 ), and another part is redistributed to the rich individual ([1 ](1 1 ) p t 1 ); both losses are avoided with a progressive tax. Nevertheless, when 2 is large enough so that it satises 2 L 1 > 2 L 2 , it becomes optimal to levy the proportional tax. What is lost when the progressive tax is levied ( 2 t 2 r ) exceeds what is lost levying the proportional tax.
It follows from Proposition 6.1 that it is more likely that levying the proportional tax is optimal the more targeted is expenditure (larger ) and the more unequal the initial distribution (larger ). 50 It is quite obvious that the disadvantages of a proportional tax 49 This follows directly from Figure 1 , since the slope of the line joining (0; 0) and (L1; L 2 ), M, is larger than one. 50 An increase in leads to an increase in L1 and L2, and a decrease in M (see Figure 2 , where the solid and dashed lines depict the situation before and after the increase in ). It follows that there exists a region in (1; 2 )-space where the progressive tax is replaced by the proportional (E), but no region where the proportional tax is substituted by the progressive tax. When increases we h a v e that the impact on L1, . An analysis of the three cases shows that for all of them there exists a region where it is optimal to substitute the progressive tax by the proportional tax, and no region where it is optimal to replace the proportional tax by the progressive tax.
taxes is more important than what is lost when the poor individual pays the proportional tax.
Conclusions
To conclude, let us summarize our main ndings.
1. The Chilean tax system is slightly regressive. This is the result of the combination of a progressive income tax that exacts little income from the richest decile, and a set of indirect taxes that are mildly regressive but yield much more revenue.
2. Income tax evasion and avoidance is quite large: around 27% of the potential tax base is not reported due to loopholes and evasion. Nevertheless, loopholes and evasion are not responsible for the low yield of the income tax. Completely eliminating them increases the average income tax rate paid by the richest decile from 3,61% to less than 6%.
3. Radical modications to the tax structure in place in 1994 (e.g., signicantly increasing the rate of VAT or substituting a at tax for the current progressive income tax) have little eect on income distribution. 4 . Some simple arithmetic to shows that the scope for directly improving the income distribution via progressive taxes is quite small, the more so the more unequal the pre-tax income distribution. Thus, even unrealistically progressive taxes have little direct impact on income distribution at the inequality levels currently prevalent i n Chile.
5. The targeting of expenditures and the average tax rate have a far bigger quantitative impact on income distribution. In the case of Chile, once the targeting of expenditures is taken into account, high-yield indirect taxes are responsible for 80.1% of the reduction in income inequality a c hieved through the redistribution of the taxes considered in this paper. By contrast, the low-yield progressive income tax accounts only for the remaining 19.9% of the reduction.
6. A simple model shows that when progressive taxes are more costly to levy and cause a larger excess burden, broad-based proportional taxes become more desirable. Somewhat surprisingly, the optimal tax system is more biased towards proportional taxes the more unequal the pre-tax distribution. Thus, the current tax structure in Chile, which relies heavily on broad-based indirect taxes like V A T, that are cheap to administer and are generally thought to produce less distortions, is probably closer to the optimum than what is usually thought.
7. The main policy implication of this paper is that the tax structure should be chosen on the basis of tax collection and eciency criteria, and not according to its redistributive merits. Distributional considerations should enter only when deciding the size of the overall tax burden.
